

Pauline MORAULT

CONTACT INFORMATION

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CURRENT POSITION

2016-2018 Teaching Assistant and Researcher (ATER), SciencesPo Paris
PhD Candidate in Aix-Marseille School of Economics

RESEARCH FIELDS

Economics of marriage and the family, Development economics, Political economy,
Game Theory, Matching, Networks

EDUCATION

SINCE SEPT. 2013 | **AMSE Doctoral Program in Economics**
Aix-Marseille School of Economics – GREQAM
Aix-Marseille Université, Marseille, France
Supervisor: Yann Bramoullé
Expected completion date: July 2018

JAN.-MARCH 2017 | **Visiting PhD at the University of Cambridge,**
Faculty of Economics, invited by Kaivan Munshi
University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom

JUNE-JULY 2014 | **Barcelona Political Economy Summer School**
Barcelona Graduate School of Economics
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain

2008-2013 | **Master Degree in Economics and Social Science**
Élève Normalien
École Normale Supérieure de Cachan, Cachan, France

2009-2011 | **Master Degree in Theory and Empirical Methods in Economics**
Paris School of Economics
Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris, France

2008-2009 | **Bachelor Degree in Economics**
Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris, France
Bachelor Degree in Sociology
Université Paris IV Paris-Sorbonne, Paris, France

2006-2008 | **CPGE Classe préparatoire B/L**
Lycée Lakanal, Sceaux, France

GRANTS AND FELLOWSHIPS

2013-2016 ENS doctoral grant, École Normale Supérieure de Cachan
2008-2012 Full student with excellence fellowship, École Normale Supérieure de Cachan

RESEARCH

WORKING PAPERS

“Arranged Marriages under Transferable Utilities”, AMSE working paper 2017-24

In many societies, marriage is a decision taken at the familial level. Arranged marriages are documented from Renaissance Europe to contemporary rural Kenya, and are still prevalent in many parts of the developing world. However, this family dimension has essentially been neglected by the existing matching literature on marriages. The objective of this paper is to introduce family considerations into the assignment game. We explore how shifting decision-making to the family level affects matching on the marriage market. We introduce a new concept of familial stability and find that it is weaker than individual stability. The introduction of families into the marriage market generates coordination problems, so the central result of the transferable utility framework no longer holds: a matching can be family-stable even if it does not maximize the sum of total marital surpluses. Interestingly, even when the stable matching is efficient, family decision-making drastically modifies how the surplus is shared-out. These results may have fundamental implications for pre-marital investments. We find that stable matchings depend on the type of family partitioning. Notably, when each family contains one son and one daughter, familial and individual stability are equivalent.

“Violence Against Rich Ethnic Minorities. A Theory of Instrumental Scapegoating”, joint work with Yann Bramoullé, AMSE working paper 2016-26

In many parts of the developing world, ethnic minorities play a central role in the economy. Examples include Chinese throughout Southeast Asia, Indians in East Africa and Lebanese in West Africa. These rich minorities are often subject to popular violence and extortion, and are treated ambiguously by local politicians. We analyze the impact of the presence of a rich ethnic minority on violence and on interactions between a rent-seeking local elite and a poor majority. We find that the local elite can always make use of the rich minority to maintain its hold on power. When the threat of violence is high, the government may change its economic policies strategically to sacrifice the minority to popular resentment. We investigate the conditions under which such instrumental scapegoating emerges, and the forms it takes. We then consider some social integration capturing, for instance, mixed marriages and shared education. Social integration reduces violence and yields qualitative changes in economic policies. Overall, our results help explain documented patterns of violence and segregation.

WORK IN PROGRESS

“Arranged Marriages, Premarital Investments and the Family Network”

In many societies, parents still greatly influence the marriage of their children. Arranged marriages are documented from Renaissance Europe to contemporary rural India and are still a widespread form of matchmaking in the developing world. However, this family dimension has been largely overlooked by the existing matching literature on marriages. When we consider complex family structures, matching on the marriage market determines the network of connected families. Families are interconnected through the marriages of their children. The objective of this paper is to study the structure of the family network and its determinants. The most segregated network structure is characterized by perfect positive assortative matching with respect to family revenue and family size. But there are forces that overcome segregation. Differentiated social norms relating to gender only are neutral with respect to the network structure, but any deviation from these norms greatly affects the network. In contrast, social norms that differentiate between children according to birth order or the gender of their siblings increase connectivity. Imbalance in the sex ratio also helps connect the family network, and the nature of the connection depends on which gender is scarce. Finally, the degree of revenue dispersion and the size of the most numerous families also impact network connectivity.

“Strategic Marriages within the Elites: a Survey”

COMMUNICATIONS

- 2018 **IRES Macro Lunch Seminar** (Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium)
2017 **Africa Meeting of the Econometric Society** (Algiers, Algeria)
66th Annual Meeting of the French Economic Association (Nice, France)
51st Annual Conference of the Canadian Economics Association (Antigonish, Canada)
7th Search and Matching Annual Conference (Barcelona, Spain)
AMSE PhD Seminar (Marseille, France)
2016 **SciencesPo Paris Friday Seminar** (Paris, France)
AMSE PhD Seminar (Marseille, France)
EDGE Jamboree 2016 (Dublin, Ireland)
2015 **64th Annual Meeting of the French Economic Association** (Rennes, France)
14th Journées Louis-André Gérard-Varet (Aix-en-Provence, France)
11th CIREQ Ph.D. Students' Conference (Montréal, Canada)
2014 **AMSE PhD Seminar** (Marseille, France)

TEACHING

- SPRING 2018 **Statistics**, 1st y, Instructor
French, SciencesPo Paris - Campus de Dijon
FALL 2017 **Core Economics**, 1st y, TA (Yann Algan, Guillaume Plantin)
English, SciencesPo Paris - Campus de Dijon
FALL 2016 **Microeconomics**, 1st y, TA (Guillaume Plantin, Anne Boring)
Mathematics, 1st y, Instructor
English and French, SciencesPo Paris - Campus de Dijon
SPRING 2016 **Microeconomics**, *Bachelor 2nd y*, TA (Hubert Stahn)
Microeconomics, *Bachelor 1st y*, TA (Frédéric Rychen)
French, Aix-Marseille Université, Marseille - Colbert
SPRING 2015 **Microeconomics**, *Bachelor 2nd y*, TA (Antonin Macé)
Microeconomics, *Bachelor 1st y*, TA (Frédéric Rychen)
French, Aix-Marseille Université, Marseille - Colbert
SPRING 2014 **Quantitative Methods**, *Bachelor 1st y*, TA (Issa Ado)
Microeconomics, *Bachelor 1st y*, TA (Frédéric Rychen)
French, Aix-Marseille Université, Marseille - Canebière and Colbert
SPRING 2011 **Economic and Social Information**, *Bachelor 1st y*, TA (Marie-Claire Ledoux)
French, Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne, Tolbiac

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

- ORGANIZER
2014-2015 **GTI & Ecolunch (weekly intern seminar)**, *AMSE*, France
2013-2015 **13th and 14th Journées Louis-André Gérard-Varet**, *AMSE*, France
RESEARCH ASSISTANT
SEPT.2012-JUNE 2013 **Survey on the Elites of Madagascar**, *IRD-Dial*, in Madagascar
FEB.-APRIL 2012 **Mobile Banking in Antananarivo**, *IRD-Dial*, in Madagascar
OCT.2011-FEB 2012 **Institutions, Governance and Growth**,
and **Financial Development and Growth**, *AFD*, in France
AUG.-OCT 2011 **Risk Aversion in Rural Benin**, *NADEL*, *ETH Zurich*, in Benin

OTHER INFORMATION

COMPUTER Matlab, Mathematica, Gephi, Stata, L^AT_EX
LANGUAGES French (native), English (fluent), Italian (good)

REFERENCES

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