Emigration and origin country's institutions: Does the destination Matter?

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Institutions and growth

- Very robust positive relationship between market-friendly institutions and growth (Acemoglu et al., 2005; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006).
- North (1990) : institutions include formal rules, constraints and enforcement characteristics.
- Rodrik (2004, 2009): evolution of institutions across countries explain much variability of per capita income; tends to wipe out any effect of trade indicators. Some indicators (e.g. corruption) have positive effects on determinants of growth (e.g. FDI).
- Institutions : many different sides $\rightarrow$ different developments in institutional quality can exert different growth effects.

Are institutions fixed?

- Institutions are persistent $\rightarrow$ need time to change through institutional reforms (Rodrik, 2009).
- Nevertheless, emigration is likely to affect evolution of institutions through a set of channels.
- One direct channel : emigration of skilled workers (brain drain) lower human capital level. Since HK is a major determinant of institutions and institutional change (Glaeser et.al, 2004) $\rightarrow$ negative impact of skilled migration on evolution of institutions.
- Nevertheless, many different channels of influence, both for total emigration and skilled emigration.

Channels at stake in migration-institution nexus

- Exit and voice mechanisms (Hirschman, 1970) : exit : emigration to non corrupted countries; voice : protest again rent-seeking government. Both involve costs. Governments incur costs of repression on protesters but looses taxes on emigrants $\rightarrow$ incentive to change tax rate.
- Pressure from outside: diasporas can exert pressure on governments through various mechanisms: double voting rights or double nationality; Diasporas as interest groups can influence foreign policy of host country.
- Financial remittances: can finance education and investment. Can also finance some political parties.

Channels at stake in migration-institution nexus

- Diasporas influence the distribution of foreign aid. Evidence from colonial links (France : 78 pct to colonies) or evidence from large diasporas (Turkey-Germany)
- Transfer of norms by diasporas or migrants. Transfer of democratic norms through foreign education (Spilimbergo, 2009). Evidence of transfer of fertility norms (Beine, Docquier, Schiff, 2008).
- Expectation channel (McHale and Li, 2009): expectation of emigration might create incentives such as investment in education.

The importance of destination

- Previous empirical analyzes of the institution-migration relationship focus on the impact of global emigration.
- Li and McHale (2009): Look at skilled and unskilled global emigration on economic institutions (cross-section set-up).
- Docquier et al. (2009): look at global impact of skilled emigration on democracy (panel set-up).
- Beine and Sekkat (2011): Look at impact of global emigration and global transfer of norms on 6 institutional measures (economic and non economic).
- All those papers do not look at where the migrants go and the specific characteristics of the destination countries. $\rightarrow$ the aim of this paper.

Importance of destination for emigration

- Theoretical channels for direct effects might be different depending on the destination.
- Political pressure from host country depends on (i) economic power: foreign aid (ii) political power: being a superpower of small country means different types of influence (iii) historical links between host and home countries: foreign aid channeled mainly to colonies.
- Foreign education: Spilimbergo (2009) shows that improvement of democratic values only if leaders acquired their education in democratic countries.
- Remittances: Flows of remittances will depend on (i) economic conditions of host countries (ii) size of diasporas which often relates to colonial links (iii) less on political power of host country.

Channels and relationships

Table: Expected channel by skills : quality of governance

	Historical	Political	Economic
Human capital	?	?	?
Exit and Voice	?	?	?
Remittances	++	+	++
Political Pressure	+	++	?
Double voting	+	?	?
Foreign education	+	?	++
Institutional norms	?	+	++

Contribution of this paper

- Revisit the institutions-migration nexus looking at importance of bilateral links between home and sending countries and the characteristics of host countries
- We consider 3 types of links
- Historical links : captured by colonial links (restrict the emigration to or transfer of norm from former colonizer)
- Political power of host countries: permanent members of the UN council of security (UNCS): 5 countries
- Economic Power: initial members of OECD countries: 20 countries
- Intersection is not so big: Russia and China not in first and third group. Only France and UK are in the three groups.

Countries and classification

Countries	Colonizers	Political	Economic
Aut, Ger, Gre, Nor			+
Ice, Ire, Lux, Swe			+
Tur, Spa, Can, Dk			+
Bel, Por, NL	+		+
Fra, UK	+	+	+
US		+	+
Chn		+	
Rus	+	+	

Note: Colonies only after WW2

Methodology

Econometric approach

- $\triangle I_{ijt} = \alpha_j + \beta_j I_{ij,t-1} + \theta_j m_{i,t-k} + \gamma_j N_{ij,t-k} + \delta_j H_{ij,t-k} + \epsilon_{ijt}$.
- Key equation: explaining institutional change of type j through 4 variables : initial level (catching up process), emigration, norms transmitted by diaspora and human capital.
- 2 basic approaches
- Panel data (pooling): imposes strong hypothesis on homogeneity of coefficient but allows to have more observations
- Repeated cross-sections : period specific impacts: (1980-1990) and (1990-2000) periods.

Indicators-lags-specification

- Impact on global index of institutional quality vs differentiated impact on various dimensions of institutions (4 dimensions)
- 2 lag structures : contemporary impact ($k = 0$) of lagged impact ($k = 1$)
- 2 specifications : without norms ($N_{ij,t-k}$) (allow to include all countries) and with norms (total emigration not considered due to lack of data).
- Many regressions: 5 dimensions*3 econometric*2 specifications*2 lag structures*3 or 4 types of link !!!!

Data

Data : institutions

- Data comes from ICRG database
- 5 different measures : one synthetic and 4 individual dimensions : quality of bureaucracy, political stability, ethnic tensions and democratic accountability.
- Annual data ranges from 1984 to 2005.
- We relate institutional outcomes to determinants observed 4 years before ($k = 0$) and 14 years before ($k = 1$) $\rightarrow$ 2 periods.
- 140 countries but still some missing data, especially for developing countries $\rightarrow$ computation of norms to the all emigration case is impossible.

Data : emigration

- Emigration data are from the WB database (Ozden et al., 2011).
- 208*208 bilateral matrix covering all migration stocks $M_{ij,t}$; 5 years (1960, 70, 80, 90, 2000). No education level
- Standard emigration rate: $m_{it} = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{J} M_{ij,t}}{P_{it}}$.
- Emigration rate towards former colonizer (Colonies only after 1945).
- Emigration rate towards politically ($\Omega = P$) or economically ($\Omega = E$) powerful countries : $\Omega m_{it} = \frac{\sum_{j \in \Omega} M_{ij,t}}{P_{it}}$.

Data : norms

- We build on Beine and Sekkat (2011)
- We compute 3 types of norms: colonial norms, economically powerful norms, and politically powerful norms.
- Absorbed norm is the institutional norm in relevant destination countries weighted by migrants' shares in those destination countries.
- Transmission depends on the emigration rate towards those destination countries.
- Transmitted norm is the product of absorbed norm and transmission technology (relevant emigration rate).
- We do not compute total norm since we have a lot of missing observations of institutional measures in a lot of developing countries.

Results

Impact on synthetic index

- Pooling assumption is clearly violated $\rightarrow$ if we pool between 80's and 90's, we get inconsistent results: $\rho < -1 \rightarrow$ impact is period specific $\rightarrow$ more attention to repeated cross section estimates (consistent catching up estimates).
- Impact of human capital found to be positive and quite robust.
- In general, direct externalities on synthetic measure are positive (β_j>0). But externalities are especially for total, economic and political links. Colonial links do not generate positive externalities and sometimes can even generate negative ones (in light with Head et al., 2010 for trade).
- No evidence of transfer of institutional norms. 2 possibilities. We do not control for skilled norms (Beine and Sekkat, 2011). Impact of norms is heterogenous on various institutional dimension $\rightarrow$ see impact on individual components.

Table 1: The impact of emigration on the change in institutions at origin by region of destination (contemporary effects)

Explanatory variables	Total emigration	Emigration to UN	Emigration to OECD	Emigration to Colonizers
		Pooled estimation: 1990 and 2000		
Constant				
$I_{i,t-1}$	-1.118	-1.115	-1.121	-1.134
	(-21.977)***	(-21.572)***	(-21.651)***	(-22.891)***
$m_{i,t}$	27.384	14.240	26.553	-207.006
	(1.256)	(0.523)	(1.303)	(-4.810)***
$H_{i,t}$	70.518	73.514	71.350	74.299
	(3.419)***	(3.575)***	(3.448)***	(3.618)***
Number of observations	228	228	228	228
Adjusted R^2	0.78	0.79	0.80	0.81
		Cross-section estimation 1980-1990		
Constant	38.265	39.841	39.976	40.025
	(11.338)***	(12.095)***	(12.385)***	(11.989)***
$I_{i,t-1}$	-0.622	-0.629	-0.639	-0.624
	(-12.916)***	(-12.633)***	(-13.128)***	(-12.112)***
$m_{i,t}$	36.125	31.495	33.040	48.587
	(4.534)***	(2.718)***	(3.807)***	(1.565)
$H_{i,t}$	38.457	40.327	40.904	40.692
	(3.767)***	(3.561)***	(3.704)***	(3.567)***
Number of observations	102	102	102	102
Adjusted R^2	0.65	0.63	0.64	0.62
		Cross-section estimation 1990-2000		
Constant	17.208	17.572	17.563	17.382
	(3.710)***	(3.792)***	(3.787)***	(3.749)***
$I_{i,t-1}$	-0.270	-0.268	-0.269	-0.259
	(-3.515)***	(-3.472)***	(-3.485)***	(-3.367)***
$m_{i,t}$	12.596	17.119	11.536	7.935
	(2.131)**	(1.711)*	(1.867)*	(0.646)
$H_{i,t}$	24.631	24.549	24.384	24.099
	(2.991)***	(2.935)***	(2.944)***	(2.876)***
Number of observations	126	126	126	126
Adjusted R^2	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.11

Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses, Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level

Table 2: The impact of emigration on the change in institutions at origin by region of destination (lagged effects)

Explanatory variables	Total emigration	Emigration to UN	Emigration to OECD	Emigration to Colonizers
		Pooled estimation: 1990 and 2000		
Constant				
$I_{i,t-1}$	-1.159	-1.167	-1.157	-1.132
	(-23.220)***	(-22.384)***	(-23.141)***	(-23.611)***
$m_{i,t-1}$	57.038	114.219	62.269	-13.534
	(2.607)***	(3.010)***	(2.936)***	(-0.122)
$H_{i,t-1}$	71.190	72.462	72.529	71.582
	(4.455)***	(4.539)***	(4.520)***	(4.423)***
Number of observations	226	226	226	226
Adjusted R^2	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.80
		Cross-section estimation 1990		
Constant	38.708	40.250	40.596	40.057
	(11.433)***	(11.978)***	(12.283)***	(11.511)***
$I_{i,t-1}$	-0.612	-0.609	-0.625	-0.598
	(-12.867)***	(-12.125)***	(-12.549)***	(-11.518)***
$m_{i,t-1}$	45.763	34.354	41.308	43.864
	(4.417)***	(2.183)**	(3.073)***	(0.802)
$H_{i,t-1}$	36.374	36.512	37.381	36.628
	(3.576)***	(3.118)***	(3.307)***	(3.155)***
Number of observations	102	102	102	102
Adjusted R^2	0.63	0.61	0.62	0.60
		Cross-section estimation 2000		
Constant	17.610	17.827	17.779	17.121
	(3.719)***	(3.772)***	(3.745)***	(3.596)***
$I_{i,t-1}$	-0.281	-0.276	-0.276	-0.253
	(-3.560)***	(-3.527)***	(-3.488)***	(-3.237)***
$m_{i,t-1}$	18.953	36.402	23.472	10.062
	(2.524)***	(2.755)***	(1.849)*	(0.814)
$H_{i,t-1}$	31.028	29.635	29.580	28.766
	(3.142)****	(3.054)***	(3.075)***	(2.915)***
Number of observations	124	124	124	124
Adjusted R^2	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.11

Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses, Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level

Table 3: The impact of host norm on the change in institutions at origin by region of destination (contemporary effects)

Explanatory variables	Emigration to UN	Emigration to OECD	Emigration to Colonizers
	Pooled estimation: 1990 and 2000		
Constant	63.88	65.90	68.01
	(20.12)***	(18.24) ***	(22.39)***
$I_{i,t-1}$	-1.112***	-1.123***	-1.140***
	(-22.486)	(-22.678)	(-22.750)
$m_{i,t}$	67.404	6.042	24.052
	(0.997)	(0.071)	(1.033)
$N^s_{i,t}$	-0.739	0.315	-2.904***
	(-0.713)	(0.304)	(-4.978)
$H_{i,t}$	68.567***	69.976***	71.311***
	(3.247)	(3.358)	(3.418)
Number of observations	228	228	228
Adjusted R^2	0.80	0.80	0.80
	Cross-section estimation 1990		
Constant	37.819***	37.845***	38.271***
	(11.183)	(10.954)	(11.311)
$I_{i,t-1}$	-0.618***	-0.615***	-0.622**
	(-12.939)	(-12.420)	(-12.777)
$m_{i,t}$	54.891***	46.954***	37.187***
	(3.053)	(2.523)	(3.718)
$N^s_{i,t}$	-0.423	-0.193	-0.095
	(-1.419)	(-0.758)	(-0.210)
$H_{i,t}$	37.807***	37.712***	38.412***
	(3.818)	(3.657)	(3.767)
Number of observations	102	102	102
Adjusted R^2	0.65	0.65	0.64
	Cross-section estimation 2000		
Constant	17.246***	17.076***	17.258***
	(3.704)	(3.655)	(3.723)
$I_{i,t-1}$	-0.270***	-0.269***	-0.273***
	(-3.510)	(-3.500)	(-3.540)
$m_{i,t}$	11.471	16.878	15.710
	(1.323)	(1.262)	(1.927)*
$N^s_{i,t}$	0.032	-0.062	-0.141
	(0.178)	(-0.362)	(-0.976)
$H_{i,t}$	24.647***	24.669***	24.691***
	(2.984)	(2.987)	(3.003)
Number of observations	126	126	126
Adjusted R^2	0.13	0.13	0.13

Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses, Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level

Table 4: The impact of host norm on the change in institutions at origin by region of destination (lagged effects)

Explanatory variables	Emigration to UN	Emigration to OECD	Emigration to Colonizers
Constant	63.88***	65.90***	68.01***
	(20.12)	(18.24)	(22.39)
$I_{i,t-1}$	-1.157***	-1.156***	-1.160***
	(-22.389)	-23.349	-23.234
$m_{i,t-1}$	66.099	129.331	55.987
	(2.007)***	(1.912)***	(2.502)***
$N^{s}_{i,t-1}$	-0.308	-1.204	-0.896
	(-0.359)	(-1.270)	(-0.798)
$H_{i,t-1}$	69.762	63.375	71.164
	(4.072)***	(3.568)***	(4.422)***
Number of observations	226	226	226
Adjusted R^2	0.80	0.81	0.80
	Cross-section estimation 1990		
Constant	38.214	38.257	38.751
	(11.308)***	(10.940)***	(11.349)***
$I_{i,t-1}$	-0.608	-0.605	-0.614
	(-12.918)***	(-12.235)***	(-12.642)***
$m_{i,t-1}$	63.221	56.066	49.551
	(3.800)***	(2.868)***	(3.587)***
$N^{s}_{i,t-1}$	-0.363	-0.176	-0.259
	(-1.460)	(-0.654)	(-0.423)
$H_{i,t-1}$	35.906	35.906	35.905
	(3.725)***	(3.531)***	(3.605)***
Number of observations	102	102	102
Adjusted R^2	0.63	0.63	0.63
	Cross-section estimation 2000		
Constant	17.823	17.726	17.971
	(3.767)***	(3.732)***	(3.766)***
$I_{i,t-1}$	-0.285	-0.281	-0.292
	(-3.619)***	(-3.538)***	(-3.623)***
$m_{i,t-1}$	12.234	10.876	25.363
	(1.642)	(1.166)	(2.873)***
$N^{s}_{i,t-1}$	0.271	0.153	-0.248
	(1.430)	(0.798)	(-1.407)
$H_{i,t-1}$	30.733	30.498	31.727
	(3.137)***	(3.108)***	(3.154)***
Number of observations	124	124	124
Adjusted R^2	0.15	0.14	0.15

Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses, Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level

Impact on individual components

- In general impact of emigration is confirmed: positive for most measures but there is significant variation still.
- Transfer of norm is weak but holds for some combination (period-measures-links).
- Evidence of positive impact for bureaucracy and democracy and economic links.

Table 5: The impact of emigration on the change in institutions at origin by region of destination and dimension of institution (lagged effects)

Variable	Colonizer 1990	UN 1990	OECD 1990	Colonizer 2000	UN 2000	OECD 2000
			Bureaucracy			
Constant	2.137	2.046	1.967	2.421	2.195	2.155
	(4.101)***	(3.964)***	(3.928)***	(6.020)***	(6.169)***	(5.943)***
$I_{i,t-1}$	-0.238	-0.248	-0.259	-0.534	-0.549	-0.540
	(-3.478)***	(-3.645)***	(-3.855)***	(-8.497)***	(-9.568)***	(-8.906)***
$m_{i,t-1}$	2.287	7.859	10.357	6.097	18.510	11.001
	(0.235)	(2.496)***	(3.361)***	(0.948)	(5.169)***	(2.297)**
$H_{i,t-1}$	3.749	3.840	3.815	14.873	14.619	14.484
	(1.411)	(1.454)	(1.482)	(5.336)***	(5.562)***	(5.632)***
Number of observations	89	89	89	114	114	114
Adjusted R^2	0.12	0.15	0.19	0.40	0.49	0.48
			Political Stability			
Constant	3.347	3.300	3.260	0.977	0.951	0.961
	(7.775)***	(7.850)***	(7.908)***	(2.460)***	(2.399)***	(2.422)***
$I_{i,t-1}$	-0.500	-0.505	-0.523	-0.527	-0.530	-0.532
	(-7.221)***	(-7.513)***	(-8.056)***	(-7.662)***	(-7.605)***	(-7.609)***
$m_{i,t-1}$	14.784	9.951	12.581	-0.228	2.406	1.420
	(1.272)	(2.111)**	(2.948)***	(-0.113)	(0.667)	(0.659)
$H_{i,t-1}$	10.424	9.841	9.730	8.989	8.976	9.012
	(3.257)***	(3.249)***	(3.476)***	(4.198)***	(4.191)***	(4.225)***
Number of observations	109	109	109	112	112	112
Adjusted R^2	0.35	0.36	0.40	0.36	0.35	0.35
			Democracy			
Constant	3.393	3.447	3.446	1.980	2.040	2.007
	(8.172)****	(8.646)***	(8.774)***	(2.552)***	(2.654)***	(2.617)***
$I_{i,t-1}$	-0.460	-0.480	-0.502	-0.223	-0.265	-0.271
	(-7.481)***	(-7.826)***	(-8.140)***	(-2.049)**	(-2.470)***	(-2.525)***
$m_{i,t-1}$	11.643	6.883	9.493	8.050	13.822	10.716
	(1.758)*	(2.305)***	(3.118)***	(5.643)***	(2.802)***	(3.760)***
$H_{i,t-1}$	10.487	10.634	10.854	2.875	3.212	3.237
	(3.508)***	(3.476)***	(3.647)***	(0.937)	(1.086)	(1.101)
Number of observations	112	112	112	121	121	121
Adjusted R^2	0.32	0.33	0.35	0.04	0.08	0.11
			Ethnic Tension			
Constant	4.770	4.650	4.646	1.701	1.692	1.692
	(7.647)***	(7.485)****	(7.545)***	(3.420)***	(3.404)***	(3.405)***
$I_{i,t-1}$	-0.460	-0.464	-0.472	-0.283	-0.282	-0.282
	(-6.641)***	(-6.759)***	(-6.875)***	(-4.853)***	(-4.716)***	(-4.759)***
$m_{i,t-1}$	-5.633	6.077	6.959	-0.609	-0.227	-0.137
	(-0.553)	(1.668)*	(2.182)**	(-0.131)	(-0.045)	(-0.054)
$H_{i,t-1}$	4.216	4.250	4.069	-0.696	-0.693	-0.693
	(1.400)	(1.393)	(1.351)	(-0.373)	(-0.369)	(-0.370)
Number of observations	111	111	111	123	123	123
Adjusted R^2	0.29	0.29	0.30	0.14	0.14	0.14

Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses, Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level

Table 6: The impact of host norm on the change in institutions at origin by region of destination and dimension of institution (lagged effects)

Variable	Colonizer 1990	UN 1990	OECD 1990	Colonizer 2000	UN 2000	OECD 2000
			Bureaucracy			
Constant	1.780	1.773	1.960	2.059	2.115	2.189
	(3.370)***	(3.279)***	(3.526)***	(5.303)***	(5.658)***	(5.760)***
$I_{i,t-1}$	-0.242	-0.241	-0.259	-0.546	-0.548	-0.541
	(-3.638)***	(-3.590)***	(-3.760)***	(-8.889)***	(-9.565)***	(-9.090)***
$m_{i,t-1}$	8.478	7.417	0.176	7.925	1.843	-1.112
	(2.534)**	(1.392)	(0.035)	(2.572)**	(1.015)	(-0.370)
$N^s_{i,t-1}$	-0.589	-0.011	0.891	-0.268	1.355	1.033
	(-0.866)	(-0.019)	(1.741)*	(-0.463)	(3.886)***	(2.510)**
$H_{i,t-1}$	3.443	3.669	3.834	14.910	14.632	14.467
	(1.415)	(1.472)	(1.479)	(5.629)***	(5.607)***	(5.750)***
Number of observations	89	89	89	114	114	114
Adjusted R^2	0.17	0.16	0.18	0.44	0.49	0.50
			Political Stability			
Constant	3.005	3.003	3.130	0.966	0.968	0.988
	(6.740)***	(6.789)***	(7.048)***	(2.423)**	(2.414)**	(2.460)**
$I_{i,t-1}$	-0.506	-0.509	-0.517	-0.530	-0.528	-0.528
	(-7.447)***	(-7.533)***	(-7.806)***	(-7.561)***	(-7.602)***	(-7.670)***
$m_{i,t-1}$	9.501	10.467	4.641	0.580	-0.786	-1.963
	(3.076)***	(2.485)**	(1.258)	(0.273)	(-0.619)	(-0.096)
$N^s_{i,t-1}$	0.171	-0.101	0.680	-0.086	0.338	0.325
	(0.186)	(-0.205)	(1.390)	(-0.320)	(0.869)	(1.230)
$H_{i,t-1}$	9.790	9.784	9.745	9.033	8.915	9.135
	(3.454***)	(3.485)***	(3.495)***	(4.209)***	(4.165)***	(4.430)***
Number of observations	109	109	109	122	122	123
Adjusted R^2	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.34	0.34	0.37
			Democracy			
Constant	3.101	2.980	3.092	1.753	1.915	2.238
	(7.578)***	(7.153)***	(7.227)***	(2.200)**	(2.392)**	(2.740)***
$I_{i,t-1}$	-0.478	-0.466	-0.476	-0.229	-0.258	-0.287
	(-7.985)***	(-7.870)***	(-7.670)***	(-1.973)*	(-2.355)**	(-2.690)***
$m_{i,t-1}$	9.468	13.305	9.550	5.002	2.222	-4.309
	(3.290)***	(3.054)***	(2.082)**	(1.215)	(0.530)	(-0.910)
$N^s_{i,t-1}$	-0.067	-0.620	-0.027	0.179	0.919	1.279
	(-0.118)	(-1.449)	(-0.058)	(0.415)	(1.529)	(2.820)***
$H_{i,t-1}$	10.359	10.063	10.353	2.822	3.113	3.463
	(3.694)***	(3.654)***	(3.604)***	(0.909)	(1.039)	(1.190)
Number of observations	112	112	112	121	121	121
Adjusted R^2	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.05	0.07	0.13
			Ethnic Tension			
Constant	4.573	4.570	4.645	1.628	1.583	1.515
	(7.087)***	(7.126)***	(7.095)***	(3.258)***	(3.143)***	(3.000)***
I_{t-1}	-0.474	-0.466	-0.471	-0.298	-0.287	-0.279
	(-6.763)***	(-6.741)***	(-6.827)***	(-4.898)***	(-4.762)***	(-4.660)***
$m_{i,t-1}$	7.312	3.166	0.058	3.674	3.685	6.181
	(2.335)*	(0.659)	(0.010)	(1.456)	(1.939)*	(2.800)***

Robustness check

- So far transmission is supposed to depend on total intensity of emigration.
- There is evidence of non linear transmission channels in norms : Chong et al. (2008) : transmission of fertility norms through media; Beine, Docquier, schiff (2008): transmission does not depend on migration intensity.
- several explanations : media, catalyst by famous migrants, return migration differs across countries.
- We test transfer of norms departing from transmission technology depending on emigration
- Main finding: more evidence of positive transfer of norm through economic links for democracy and bureaucratic quality.

Table 7: The impact of host norm on the change in institutions at origin by region of destination and dimension of institution (lagged effects)-robustness check

Variable	Colonizer 1990	UN 1990	OECD 1990	Colonizer 2000	UN 2000	OECD 2000
			Bureaucracy			
Constant	2.064	7.644	-1.765	2.277	6.702	-4.798
	(3.330)***	(1.000)	(0.337)	(4.630)***	(8.410)***	(-1.840)*
$I_{i,t-1}$	-0.246	-0.231	-0.249	-0.543	-0.537	-0.551
	(-3.660)***	(-3.590)***	(-3.730)***	(-9.000)***	(-8.940)***	(-9.300)***
$m_{i,t-1}$	7.504	6.947	7.084	7.131	6.7562	7.001
	(2.72)***	(2.690)***	(2.635)***	(3.200)**	(2.950)***	(3.120)***
$NA^{s}_{i,t-1}$	-0.037	-0.492	0.312	-0.023	-0.388	0.592
	(-1.111)	(-0.780)	(1.960)**	(-0.034)	(-6.080)***	(2.640)***
$H_{i,t-1}$	2.461	3.754	3.775	14.022	15.179	14.994
	(1.060)	(1.520)	(1.510)	(4.940)***	(5.750)***	(5.840)***
Number of observations	89	89	89	114	114	114
Adjusted R^2	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.46	0.47	0.48
			Political Stability			
Constant	3.001	1.813	1.611	0.867	0.740	-4.010
	(5.340)***	(1.170)	(1.060)	(1.860)*	(0.788)	(-1.800)*
$I_{i,t-1}$	-0.507	-0.512	-0.508	-0.528	-0.531	-0.575
	(-7.180)***	(-7.520)***	(-7.570)***	(-7.500)***	(-7.560)***	(-8.440)***
$m_{i,t-1}$	9.824	9.871	9.796	0.280	0.371	0.170
	(3.520)***	(3.580)***	(3.500)***	(0.190)	(0.260)	(0.918)
$NA^{s}_{i,t-1}$	0.001	.0108	0.127	0.008	0.019	0.497
	(0.003)	(0.790)	(0.970)	(0.290)	(0.007)	(2.300)**
$H_{i,t-1}$	9.790	9.840	9.915	9.479	9.254	10.317
	(3.470***)	(3.580)***	(3.570)***	(4.190)***	(4.410)***	(5.040)***
Number of observations	109	109	109	123	123	123
Adjusted R^2	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.361	0.36	0.38
			Democracy			
Constant	3.616	3.334	-4.093	2.267	1.915	6.731
	(6.950)***	(2.100)**	(-1.130)	(2.070)**	(2.392)**	(1.040)
$I_{i,t-1}$	-0.508	-0.477	-0.477	-0.254	-0.229	-0.225
	(-8.410)***	(-8.100)***	(-8.390)***	(-2.040)**	(-2.02)**	(-4.660)***
$m_{i,t-1}$	9.687	9.301	9.709	6.072	5.587	5.815
	(3.960)***	(3.890)***	(3.870)***	(2.040)**	(2.200)**	(2.320)**
$NA^{s}_{i,t-1}$	-0.052	-0.020	0.617	-0.048	-0.141	-0.427
	(-1.570)	(-0.150)	(2.030)**	(-0.990)	(-1.120)	(-0.770)
$H_{i,t-1}$	9.356	10.398	10.461	1.605	2.923	2.645
	(3.370)***	(3.760)***	(3.800)***	(0.577)	(0.950)	(0.398)
Number of observations	112	112	112	121	121	121
Adjusted R^2	0.40	0.38	0.41	0.09	0.08	0.09
			Ethnic Tension			
Constant	5.056	1.924	4.403	1.883	-0.130	-1.637
	(5.33)***	(0.640)	(2.930)***	(1.290)	(0.005)	(-0.960)
$I_{i,t-1}$	-0.497	-0.461	-0.467	-0.294	-.285	-0.276
	(-5.620)***	(-6.700)***	(-6.810)***	(-4.950)***	(-4.720)***	(-4.740)***
$m_{i,t-1}$	5.297	5.052	4.753	2.370	2.287	2.753

Conclusion

- Destination definitely matters for impact of emigration on institutions.
- In general, impact is stronger between countries with economic links and to a lesser extent for political links
- Results are nevertheless very heterogenous
- It depends on types of institutional dimensions.
- It depends on specific period (bureaucratic quality impacted during both periods, less the case for other measures). Stronger results over the nineties compared to eighties.
- Economic links matter much more than any other type of link? Colonial links might be detrimental.